This project explores agencies’ practices under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 and other statutes, looking at the use of acting officials and of delegations of authority during periods in which a Senate-confirmed position sits vacant. Among other things, it examines how agencies design systems for succession planning, assign appropriate titles, and communicate relevant information to the public.
This project studies agencies’ appellate review of hearing-level adjudicative decisions. Topics include the structure, composition, functions, procedures, and authority of agency appellate bodies. Resulting recommendations will focus on the ways in which agencies can enhance both the efficiency and fairness of appellate review.
This project studies agency-level bid protest procedures under the Federal Acquisition Regulation and agency-specific regulations. It analyzes agency-specific regulations governing a variety of bid protest procedures, including higher-level agency review, insertion of clauses regarding protest procedures in solicitations, and discovery and exchange of information during protests.
This project will explore institutional issues related to the placement of agency economists as they concern agency rulemaking. It will consider whether and when an agency’s economic-analysis function should be centralized within the agency and how best to integrate economists’ work with that of rule-writers, attorneys, and other officials to ensure that economic issues are appropriately considered.
