



**Issue Exhaustion in Preenforcement  
Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking  
Committee on Judicial Review  
Proposed Recommendation | June 4, 2015**

**Proposed Amendments**

**This document displays manager’s amendments (with no marginal notes) and additional amendments from Conference members (with the source shown in the margin).**

1           The requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies (“remedy  
2 exhaustion”) is a familiar feature of U.S. administrative law. This doctrine **generally** bars a party  
3 from appealing a final agency action to a court until it exhausts prescribed avenues for relief  
4 before the agency.<sup>1</sup> Remedy exhaustion ordinarily applies only to administrative adjudications,  
5 **such as** where a ~~n agency has established a~~ mandatory appeals process **is established** by  
6 regulation or statute.<sup>2</sup> The related but distinct concept of “issue exhaustion” ~~would bars~~ a  
7 petitioner for judicial review from raising issues in court it had not raised before the agency, even  
8 if the petitioner ~~had~~ exhausted administrative remedies.<sup>3</sup> As with remedy exhaustion, the issue

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<sup>1</sup> Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938).

<sup>2</sup> Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993) (holding that, “[w]hile federal courts may be free to apply, where appropriate, other prudential doctrines of judicial administration to limit the scope and timing of judicial review, [5 U.S.C. § 704] [], by its very terms, has limited the availability of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to that which the statute or rule clearly mandates”).

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., FiberTower Spectrum Holdings, LLC v. FCC, No. 14-1039, slip. op. at 9 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (“Because FiberTower failed to present its § 309(j)(4)(B) argument to the Commission, the Commission never had an opportunity to pass on it, and FiberTower thereby failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.”).



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9 exhaustion doctrine initially arose in the context of agency adjudications.<sup>4</sup> Unlike remedy  
10 exhaustion, however, issue exhaustion can be applied by courts reviewing agency rulemakings.  
11 It does not preclude consideration of issues that were raised by participants in the rulemaking  
12 other than the litigant.<sup>5</sup>

13 Congress expressly required parties to raise all their objections before adjudicatory  
14 agencies in several judicial review provisions adopted during the 1930s, prior to the advent of  
15 modern rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. **Federal courts continue to**  
16 **enforce these provisions today,<sup>6</sup> although they may not always be jurisdictional.<sup>7</sup>**—The typical  
17 statute **applies to agency adjudications,**—contains an exception for “reasonable grounds” or  
18 “extraordinary circumstances,” and permits the court to require an agency to take new evidence  
19 under certain conditions.<sup>8</sup> Only two statutes **were have been** identified as explicitly requiring  
20 issue exhaustion for review of agency rules—the Clean Air Act and the Securities Exchange Act of  
21 1934.<sup>9</sup> Both provisions were adopted in the 1970s, when Congress enacted numerous regulatory

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<sup>4</sup> See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, FAIL TO COMMENT AT YOUR OWN RISK: DOES EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES/ISSUE EXHAUSTION HAVE A PLACE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES? at 2-3 (DRAFT April 10/May 5, 2015) (Report to the Administrative Conference of the U.S.) [hereinafter Lubbers Report].

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., *Portland General Elec. Co. v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 501 F.3d 1009, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).

<sup>6</sup> E.g., *Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB*, 547 Fed. Appx. 812 (9th Cir. 2013) (enforcing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)); *Hill v. FCC*, 496 Fed. Appx. 396 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying 47 U.S.C. § 405).

<sup>7</sup> E.g., *EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.*, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1602-03 (2014) (“A rule may be ‘mandatory,’ yet not ‘jurisdictional,’ we have explained. Section 7607(d)(7)(B), we hold, is of that character. It does not speak to a court’s authority, but only to a party’s procedural obligations.”) (citations omitted); see also *Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMSCA*, 429 F.3d 1136, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“as a general matter, a party’s presentation of issues during a rulemaking proceeding is not a *jurisdictional* matter”) (emphasis in original).

<sup>8</sup> E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8(d)(1).

<sup>9</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(1). Provisions governing agency “orders” have been held to apply to judicial review of rules. See *discussion in* *Citizens Awareness Network v. U.S.*, 391 F. 2d 338, 345-47 (1st Cir. 2004). ~~See also~~ *Investment Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Govs.*, 551 F.2d 1270, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1977); *American Public Gas Ass’n*



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22 statutes with significant rulemaking provisions.<sup>10</sup> Since that time, appellate courts have  
23 increasingly applied issue exhaustion when reviewing preenforcement challenges to agency  
24 rules.<sup>11</sup>

25 Judicial application of the issue exhaustion doctrine is often discretionary, particularly in  
26 rulemaking cases. ~~Courts reviewing agency adjudications have inferred support for application~~  
27 ~~of the issue exhaustion doctrine from remedy exhaustion statutes<sup>12</sup> or from agency regulations~~  
28 ~~requiring issue exhaustion in administrative appeals.<sup>13</sup>~~ Courts have ~~also~~ imposed issue  
29 exhaustion ~~requirements~~ in the absence of an underlying statute or regulation ~~requiring it~~, such  
30 as in the Supreme Court's 1952 decision in *United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.*, which  
31 reviewed an adjudicative order issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission ~~after an~~

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v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 546 F.2d 983, 986-88 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Issue exhaustion may be enforced when rules are reviewed under these provisions. See, e.g., *ECEE, Inc. v. FERC*, 611 F.2d 554, 559-66 (5th Cir. 1980). ~~Issue exhaustion statutes may not always be jurisdictional. E.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1602-03 (2014) ("A rule may be 'mandatory,' yet not 'jurisdictional,' we have explained. Section 7607(d)(7)(B), we hold, is of that character. It does not speak to a court's authority, but only to a party's procedural obligations.") (citations omitted); see also Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMSCA, 429 F.3d 1136, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("as a general matter, a party's presentation of issues during a rulemaking proceeding is not a jurisdictional matter") (emphasis in original).~~

<sup>10</sup> Lubbers Report, *supra* note 4, at 4, 11, 13.

<sup>11</sup> E.g., *City of Portland, Or. v. EPA*, 507 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2007); *Military Toxics Project v. EPA*, 146 F.3d 948, 956-57 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior*, 134 F.3d 1095, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Lubbers Report, *supra* note 4, at 267-30 (describing application of the doctrine as well as varied precedent in appellate courts other than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).

<sup>12</sup> E.g., *Sola v. Holder*, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) which states that "A court may review a final order only if — (1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies" — to require issue exhaustion).

<sup>13</sup> See *Sims v. Apfel*, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (citing examples from the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals).



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32 **adversarial hearing**.<sup>14</sup> In this case, the Supreme Court described the “general rule that courts  
33 should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred  
34 but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice” as one of  
35 “simple fairness.”<sup>15</sup> It also said that issue exhaustion promotes orderly procedure and good  
36 administration by offering the agency an opportunity to act on objections to its proceedings.<sup>16</sup>

37 However, questions about common law application of the doctrine were raised by the  
38 Supreme Court’s more recent decision in *Sims v. Apfel*, which held that judicial application of an  
39 issue exhaustion requirement was inappropriate on review of the Social Security Administration’s  
40 informal, non-adversarial adjudicatory benefit determinations.<sup>17</sup> While at least two appellate  
41 courts have continued to apply the doctrine on review of administrative rulemaking after  
42 considering *Sims*, courts have inconsistently adhered to the **is distinction between formal**  
43 **adversarial and informal non-adversarial proceedings**.<sup>18</sup> Scholars have since observed that issue

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<sup>14</sup> 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952).

<sup>15</sup> *Id.*; see *Advocates for Hwy. & Auto Safety v. FMCSA*, 429 F.3d 1136, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying the same rationale to rulemaking).

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*; see also *Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Sally Jewell*, Civ. No. 12-1431, slip. op. at 22 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2015) (holding on review of an agency adjudicatory decision that “the question in determining whether an issue was preserved, however, is not simply whether it was raised in some fashion, but whether it was raised with sufficient precision, clarity, and emphasis to give the agency a fair opportunity to address it”).

<sup>17</sup> *Sims v. Apfel*, 530 U.S. 103, at 108-12 (2000) (“[T]he desirability of a court imposing a requirement of issue exhaustion depends on the degree to which the analogy to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular administrative proceeding”).

<sup>18</sup> See *Advocates for Hwy. & Auto Safety v. FMCSA*, 429 F.3d at 1148-49; *Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson*, 363 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). But see *Alaska Survival v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 705 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a Surface Transportation Board (STB) exemption as a rulemaking but applying the *Sims* rationale to it because “the STB’s procedures were informal and provided no notice to interested parties that to later challenge the STB’s decision one must submit comments during the exemption process”).



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44 exhaustion “cases conspicuously lack discussion of whether, when, why, or how exhaustion  
45 doctrine developed in the context of adjudication should be applied to rulemaking.”<sup>19</sup>

46 As set forth below, the Administrative Conference’s research identified competing **claims**  
47 **considerations** about the advisability of the doctrine. Its Recommendation urges courts to  
48 recognize that issue exhaustion principles developed in the context of adversarial agency  
49 adjudications may not always apply in the context of preenforcement review of rulemaking, but  
50 also recognizes that courts generally should not resolve issues litigants did not raise during the  
51 administrative rulemaking proceeding. It identifies circumstances where common law  
52 application of an issue exhaustion requirement may not be appropriate, and urges agencies to  
53 pursue an issue exhaustion defense in litigation only when they have a good faith belief that none  
54 of the exceptions would apply.

55 **The Recommendation is limited in scope to preenforcement review of agency rulemaking,**  
56 **where litigants seek direct review of a rule prior to its application to particular persons in**  
57 **enforcement proceedings.<sup>20</sup> Although the Administrative Conference recommends that statutes**  
58 **should, to the extent possible, be read to include the exceptions set forth in the**

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<sup>19</sup> -Lubbers Report, *supra* note 4, at [40-11](#) (citing PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL, GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1246 (10th ed. 2003)); *see also* Koretoff v. Vilsack, 707 F.3d 394, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Williams, J., concurring) (joining a decision to preclude preenforcement review of new issues but writing separately “primarily to note that in the realm of judicial review of agency rules, much of the language of our opinions on ‘waiver’ has been a good deal broader than the actual pattern of our holdings, and that that pattern itself may unfairly disadvantage parties that are generally not well represented by interest groups”).

<sup>20</sup> **The passage of time and new entrants may complicate the inquiry in cases where a rule is challenged in response to an agency enforcement action. The Conference has previously identified issues that Congress should not ordinarily preclude courts from considering when rules are challenged in enforcement proceedings. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 82-7, *Judicial Review of Rules in Enforcement Proceedings* (Dec. 17, 1982), available at [www.acus.gov/82-7](http://www.acus.gov/82-7).**



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59 Recommendation, it did not consider whether Congress should enact new statutory issue  
60 exhaustion requirements.

61 Regardless of whether an issue exhaustion requirement applies, the Conference believes  
62 that stakeholders and agencies typically benefit when issues are raised at the agency level prior  
63 to judicial review.<sup>21</sup> It is advisable for participants in a rulemaking to raise even constitutional  
64 issues, which the Conference recommends should generally not be subject to an issue exhaustion  
65 requirement. In some cases, this will give the agency an opportunity to adjust its rule to eliminate  
66 the constitutional objection or at least to explain why its rule does not raise constitutional  
67 concerns.

68 Although the Administrative Conference recommends that statutes should, to the extent  
69 possible, be read to include the exceptions it sets forth in the Recommendation, it did not  
70 consider whether Congress should enact new statutory issue exhaustion requirements. The  
71 Recommendation is limited in scope to pre-enforcement review of agency rulemaking, where  
72 litigants seek direct review of a rule prior to its application to particular persons in enforcement  
73 proceedings.<sup>22</sup>

**Commented [CMA1]:** This is offered as a Manager's Amendment because it was agreed to in principle by the Committee on Judicial Review, pending finalization of appropriate language.

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<sup>21</sup> A material change in circumstances that occurs after the opportunity for public comment closed but prior to, or within 30 days after, the issuance of a rule, may provide an appropriate opportunity for stakeholders to request and agencies to authorize a reopening of the rulemaking proceeding.

<sup>22</sup> The passage of time and new entrants may complicate the inquiry in cases where a rule is challenged in response to an agency enforcement action. The Conference has previously identified issues that Congress should not ordinarily preclude courts from considering when rules are challenged in enforcement proceedings. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 82-7, *Judicial Review of Rules in Enforcement Proceedings* (Dec. 17, 1982), available at [www.acus.gov/82-7](http://www.acus.gov/82-7).



74 **Considerations Supporting for an Issue Exhaustion Requirement in Preenforcement Review of**  
75 **Administrative Rulemaking**

76 Many of the justifications for application of the issue exhaustion doctrine in judicial  
77 review of agency adjudicatory decisions apply squarely to review of rulemakings. Issue  
78 exhaustion is said to promote active public participation in rulemaking proceedings, create  
79 orderly processes for resolution of important legal and policy issues raised in rulemakings, ensure  
80 fully informed decisionmaking by administrative agencies and a robust record for judicial review,  
81 and provide a certainty and finality to rulemakings that conserves the resources of agencies,  
82 courts, and the regulated parties. There is also a concern that, without issue exhaustion, agencies  
83 may feel the need to try to anticipate new arguments in court that were not brought to their  
84 attention earlier, thus producing problematic delays and overburdening agencies.

85 The argument for judicial application of the doctrine in rulemaking may be especially  
86 strong in challenges under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, such as where the  
87 challenge is to the factual basis of the rule or a claim is made that reasonable alternatives should  
88 have been adopted, or to an agency's failure to exercise its discretion in a particular manner. In  
89 those cases, judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of an agency's action may depend heavily  
90 on the administrative record or on contentions that were presented to the agency during the  
91 rulemaking. Application of the doctrine in such cases spares courts from hearing issues that could  
92 have been cured at the administrative level and reduces the need for agencies to create post-hoc  
93 rationalizations.

94 Judicial application of the issue exhaustion doctrine is arguably also compelling in  
95 challenges to rulemakings of particular applicability or ~~more formal~~ rulemakings, ~~such as those~~  
96 that include a right to an evidentiary hearing. Even in informal rulemakings, potential  
97 commenters may have some responsibility to raise an issue that they may later invoke to



98 challenge the rule in court.<sup>23</sup> Many agencies have adopted procedures for obtaining input on  
99 their rulemakings from interested stakeholders and the widespread use of electronic rulemaking  
100 dockets and other Internet- and social media-based outlets for public involvement have  
101 increased the public’s access to the government rulemaking process.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, the  
102 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), provides a procedural mechanism for addressing  
103 issues that were not presented to the agency during a rulemaking proceeding—the public’s right  
104 to petition agencies for amendment or repeal of rules. **Additionally, several statutes containing**  
105 **issue exhaustion requirements, including the Clean Air Act and the Federal Communications Act,**  
106 **specifically provide for an agency reconsideration process.<sup>25</sup>**

107 **Concerns with an Issue Exhaustion Requirement in Preenforcement Review of Administrative**  
108 **Rulemaking**

109 Nonetheless, some scholars and practitioners argue that courts should not uncritically  
110 apply issue exhaustion principles developed in the context of adversarial agency adjudications to  
111 the distinguishable context of rulemaking.<sup>26</sup> They query whether judicial precedent that fails to  
112 make such distinctions strongly supports general application of the doctrine in judicial review of

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<sup>23</sup> See *Koretoff*, 707 F.3d at 401 (Williams, J., concurring) (commenting that “[g]enerally speaking, then, the price for a ticket to facial review is to raise objections in the rulemaking”).

<sup>24</sup> See, e.g., Transparency in EPA’s Operations, Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator to All EPA Employees (Apr. 2009); see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2013-5, *Social Media in Rulemaking* (Dec. 5, 2013), available at [www.acus.gov/2013-5](http://www.acus.gov/2013-5); see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2011-8, *Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking* (Dec. 9, 2011) (describing observations of a variety of innovative public engagement practices at federal agencies), available at [www.acus.gov/2011-8](http://www.acus.gov/2011-8).

<sup>25</sup> E.g., 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(7)(B); 47 U.S.C. 405(a).

<sup>26</sup> See William Funk, *Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies—New Dimensions Since Darby*, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (offering examples to support the argument that “[u]nfortunately, some courts have ignored the specific statutory origin for [issue exhaustion] and have applied a similar exhaustion requirement in cases totally unrelated to that statute, while citing cases involving application of that statute”).





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113 administrative rulemaking. Critics of a prudential issue exhaustion requirement also cite the  
114 presumption of reviewability for final agency actions established by Administrative Procedure  
115 Act.<sup>27</sup> Some would go so far as to say that issue exhaustion should generally not apply in the  
116 absence of an authorizing statute, particularly in light of the high level of deference given to  
117 agencies on judicial review.

118 Those who are wary of generally applying the doctrine in review of administrative  
119 rulemaking also offer some policy arguments against its application. They point out that  
120 administrative agencies have an affirmative responsibility in rulemaking ~~proceedings~~ to  
121 adequately explain the basis and purpose of the rule, and to necessarily raise and decide issues  
122 that will affect persons who may not be represented. ~~Some fear that o~~Overbroad application of  
123 the doctrine to rulemakings could serve as a barrier to judicial review for persons or firms whose  
124 interests are not ~~in close alignment~~aligned with those persons or firms dominating the  
125 ~~associations representing group viewpoints~~large or experienced commenters and who  
126 reasonably do not find it worthwhile to engage in continuous monitoring of the ~~agency in~~  
127 ~~question~~rulemaking process that such commenters routinely conduct.<sup>28</sup>

128 There is also a concern that issue exhaustion requirements may induce rulemaking  
129 participants to try to comment on every possible issue, or to save their comments for the last  
130 minute.<sup>29</sup> Some scholars fear that issue exhaustion requirements import the threat of litigation  
131 into administrative rulemakings, resulting in voluminous administrative records that raise further

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<sup>27</sup> 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704.

<sup>28</sup> *Koretzoff*, 707 F.3d at 401 (Williams, J., concurring).

<sup>29</sup> See Lubbers Report, *supra* note 4, at 398-420.



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132 apprehensions regarding information overload or regulatory ossification.<sup>30</sup> Although some  
133 degree of foresight may fairly be expected, stakeholders may not be able to predict and comment  
134 on every contingency.

### 135 **Exceptions**

136 ~~Both sides agree that, e~~ven where statutes prescribe issue exhaustion, the case law  
137 recognizes certain exceptions.<sup>31</sup> For example, courts have relied on their equitable authority to  
138 read extraordinary circumstances exceptions, such as those traditionally applicable in remedy  
139 exhaustion cases, into statutes where they were lacking.<sup>32</sup> The Conference recognizes that courts  
140 applying the issue exhaustion doctrine prudentially retain some discretion to waive its  
141 application.<sup>33</sup> The following Recommendation seeks to offer guidance to the judiciary and  
142 agencies regarding when exceptions to application of the doctrine in review of administrative  
143 rulemaking may be appropriate.

## RECOMMENDATION

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<sup>30</sup> See Wendy E. Wagner, *Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture*, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1363-64 (2010).

<sup>31</sup> *Washington Ass'n for Television and Children v. FCC*, 712 F.2d 677, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[Our] cases assume that § 405 contains implied exceptions without explaining why. We understand these cases, however, as implicitly interpreting § 405 to codify the judicially-created doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which permits courts some discretion to waive exhaustion.”) (footnotes omitted).

<sup>32</sup> *Id.* (collecting cases); see generally Lubbers Report, *supra* note 4.

<sup>33</sup> When a court declines to apply issue exhaustion principles to preclude review of new issues, the agency must be given an opportunity to respond to that issue on the merits. Courts have a variety of options for soliciting the agency’s views. In appropriate circumstances, these may include permitting the agency to brief the issue or supplement the administrative record, or ordering a remand for the limited purpose of soliciting the agency’s views.



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144 1. Courts should recognize that issue exhaustion principles developed in the context of  
145 adversarial agency adjudications may not always apply in the context of preenforcement  
146 rulemaking review.

147 2. As a general principle, in preenforcement review of administrative rulemaking, courts  
148 should not resolve issues that were not raised during the rulemaking proceeding with sufficient  
149 specificity in the rulemaking proceeding to give the agency an opportunity to address them. This  
150 is particularly true for challenges to the factual support for the rule in the administrative record  
151 or to an the agency's failure to exercise its discretion in a particular manner.

152 3. Issue exhaustion should not preclude consideration of issues that were raised with  
153 sufficient specificity in the rulemaking proceeding by the petitioner or any other participant,  
154 whether or not that participant is a party to subsequent litigation challenging the agency's action.

155 4. Except where a statute directs otherwise, judicial consideration of previously unstated  
156 objections in an administrative rulemaking proceeding may be warranted, for example, under  
157 the following circumstances:

158 (a) The agency addressed the issue in the rulemaking proceeding.

159 (b) The issue was so fundamental to the rulemaking proceeding or to the rule's basis and  
160 purpose that the agency had a responsibility to address ~~it~~ the issue on its own initiative.

161 This narrow exception may include:

162 i. basic obligations of rulemaking procedure, such as well recognized  
163 established requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act or other  
164 government-wide procedural statutes, governing statutes, or regulations; or

165 ii. unambiguous-fundamental limitations on the agency's statutory authority; or

166 iii. explicit or otherwise well-established substantive criteria or requirements  
167 prescribed by applicable statutes or regulations.

**Commented [CMA2]:** This change was proposed by Cynthia Farina and was not intended to be substantive. It was offered to avoid potential confusion resulting from overlap in the language of a Chevron analysis.



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168 (c) The litigant has demonstrated that the agency’s established position on the issue  
169 would have made raising **the this** issue in the rulemaking proceeding futile. Futility should  
170 not be lightly presumed.

171 (d) The issue could not have been raised during the rulemaking proceeding, such as  
172 because the procedures used by the agency precluded it.

173 (e) This issue is an objection that the rule violates the U.S. Constitution.

174 ~~(e)(f) The relevance or importance of the issue was not reasonably foreseeable at a time  
175 when rulemaking participants could still raise it in a timely comment.~~

176 ~~(f)(g) Other extraordinary similar~~ circumstances excuse the failure to raise the objection  
177 in the rulemaking proceeding.

178 5. Agencies should consider the foregoing circumstances when deciding whether to  
179 assert issue exhaustion as a litigation defense.

180 6. Reviewing courts should allow litigants **challenging administrative rulemakings to have**  
181 **an full opportunity to demonstrate that they some participant did in fact adequately raise an the**  
182 **issue first with the agency during the rulemaking or that any of the above circumstances—**  
183 **militating against application of the exist to justify not requiring issue exhaustion doctrine—are**  
184 **present.**

185 7. **Reviewing courts should allow Aa** agencies **should be given** an opportunity to defend  
186 the merits of a rulemaking against new objections raised in the judicial review proceeding.

187 8. To the extent possible, statutory requirements for issue exhaustion should be  
188 construed and applied in accordance with the foregoing recommendations. New statutory issue  
189 exhaustion requirements for rulemaking, if any, should also adhere to these recommendations.

**Commented [CMA3]:** Farina (Morrison) Amendment.

**Commented [CMA4]:** Senior Fellow Judge Stephen F. Williams:

“The preamble rightly notes at lines 16-17 that when Congress goes out of its way to insist on exhaustion it typically provides an exception for “reasonable grounds” or “exceptional circumstances.” Here the Conference is bringing a problem to the attention of courts functioning in the manner of common law courts, and setting out a group of specific instances (subsections 4(a) through 4(e) of the recommendation) calling for an exception to the general rule. Common law courts look for similarity between prior cases and the case at hand. If it were the case that all the conditions in (a) through (e) qualified as extraordinary, then use of “extraordinary” in (f) would make sense. But that seems to me a stretch. Rather than assigning a label to the conditions that generally justify an exception, I think it would make sense to exhort the courts to act as they normally do, i.e., look for similarities.”