



Memorandum

To: Committee on Judicial Review
From: Stephanie Tatham, Staff Counsel
Date: April ~~13~~21, 2015
Re: Revised Draft Recommendation – Issue Exhaustion

The following draft recommendation is based on Special Counsel Jeffrey Lubbers’ report, “Fail to Comment at Your Own Risk: Does Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Have a Place in Judicial Review of Rules” and was informed by the Committee’s discussion at its April 1, 2015 ~~meeting and~~ April 17, 2015 meetings. This draft is intended to facilitate the Committee’s discussion at its April ~~17~~27, 2015 public meeting, and not to preempt Committee discussion and consideration of recommendations. In keeping with Conference practice, a draft preamble has also been included. The aim of the preamble is to explain the problem or issue the recommendation is designed to address, and the Committee should feel free to revise it as appropriate.

**Issue Exhaustion in Preenforcement
Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking**

1 The requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies (“remedy
2 exhaustion”) is a familiar feature of U.S. administrative law. ~~Remedy exhaustion~~This doctrine
3 bars a party from appealing ~~an~~ a final agency action to a court until it exhausts prescribed avenues
4 for relief before the agency.¹ ~~It~~Remedy exhaustion ordinarily applies only to administrative
5 adjudications where an agency has established a mandatory appeals process.² by regulation or

¹ Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938).

² ~~Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993).~~



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6 statute.³ The related but distinct concept of “issue exhaustion” doctrine would bar a petitioner
7 for judicial review from raising issues in court it had not raised before the agency in litigation,
8 even if the petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies.⁴ As with remedy exhaustion, the
9 issue exhaustion doctrine initially arose in the context of agency adjudication.⁵ adjudications.⁶
10 Unlike remedy exhaustion, however, issue exhaustion can be applied by courts reviewing agency
11 rulemakings.

12 Congress expressly required parties to raise all their objections before adjudicatory
13 agencies in several judicial review provisions adopted during the 1930s, prior to the advent of
14 modern rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. Federal courts continue to
15 enforce these provisions today;⁷ although they may not always be jurisdictional.⁸ The typical
16 statute applies to agency adjudications, contains an exception for “reasonable grounds” or

³ Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993) (holding “[w]hile federal courts may be free to apply, where appropriate, other prudential doctrines of judicial administration to limit the scope and timing of judicial review, [5 U.S.C. § 704] [], by its very terms, has limited the availability of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to that which the statute or rule clearly mandates”).

⁴ See, e.g., FiberTower Spectrum Holdings, LLC v. Fed’l Comm. Comm’n/FCC, No. 14-1039, slip. op. at 9 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (“Because FiberTower failed to present its § 309(j)(4)(B) argument to the Commission, the Commission never had an opportunity to pass on it, and FiberTower thereby failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.”).

⁵ See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, FAIL TO COMMENT AT YOUR OWN RISK: DOES EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES HAVE A PLACE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES? at 2-3 (DRAFT April 10, 2015) (Report to the Administrative Conference of the U.S.) [hereinafter Lubbers Report].

⁶ See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, FAIL TO COMMENT AT YOUR OWN RISK: DOES EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES HAVE A PLACE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES? at 2-3 (DRAFT April 10, 2015) (Report to the Administrative Conference of the U.S.) [hereinafter Lubbers Report].

⁷ E.g., Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n v. NLRB, 547 Fed. Appx. 812 (9th Cir. 2013) (enforcing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)); Hill v. FCC, 496 Fed. Appx. 396 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying 47 U.S.C. § 405).

⁸ E.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1602-03 (2014) (“A rule may be ‘mandatory,’ yet not ‘jurisdictional,’ we have explained. Section 7607(d)(7)(B), we hold, is of that character. It does not speak to a court’s authority, but only to a party’s procedural obligations.”) (citations omitted); see also Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMSCA, 429 F.3d 1136, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“as a general matter, a party’s presentation of issues during a rulemaking proceeding is not a *jurisdictional* matter”) (emphasis in original).



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17 “extraordinary circumstances,” and permits the court to require an agency to take new evidence
18 under certain conditions.⁹ Only two statutes were identified as explicitly requiring issue
19 exhaustion for review of agency rules—the Clean Air Act and the Securities Exchange Act of
20 1934.¹⁰ Both provisions were adopted in the 1970s, when Congress enacted numerous
21 regulatory statutes with significant rulemaking provisions.¹¹ Since that time, appellate courts
22 have increasingly applied issue exhaustion when reviewing [facial challenges to agency rules](#).¹²

23 Judicial application of the issue exhaustion doctrine is often [prudential discretionary](#),
24 particularly in rulemaking cases. Courts reviewing agency adjudications have inferred support
25 for application of the issue exhaustion doctrine from remedy exhaustion statutes¹³ or from
26 agency regulations requiring issue exhaustion in administrative appeals.¹⁴ Courts have also
27 imposed issue exhaustion requirements in the absence of an underlying statute or regulation—
28 [such as in the Supreme Court’s 1952 decision in *United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.*](#),

⁹ *E.g.*, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8(d)(1).

¹⁰ 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(1). Provisions governing agency “orders” have been held to apply to judicial review of rules.— See discussion in *Citizens Awareness Network v. U.S.*, 391 F. 2d 338, 345-47 (1st Cir. 2004). See also *Investment Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Govs.*, 551 F.2d 1270, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1977); *American Public Gas Ass’n v. Federal Fed. Power Comm’n*, 546 F.2d 983, 986-88 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Issue exhaustion may be enforced when rules are reviewed under these provisions. See, *e.g.*, *ECEE, Inc. v. FERC*, 611 F.2d 554, 559-66 (5th Cir. 1980).

¹¹ Lubbers Report, [supra note 6](#), at 13.

¹² *E.g.*, *City of Portland, Or. v. EPA*, 507 F.3d 706, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2007); *Military Toxics Project v. EPA*, 146 F.3d 948, 956–57 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior*, 134 F.3d 1095, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Lubbers Report, [supra note 6](#), at 26-30 (describing application of the doctrine as well as varied precedent in appellate courts other than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).

¹³ *E.g.*, *Sola v. Holder*, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)—which states that “A court may review a final order only if — (1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies”—to require issue exhaustion).

¹⁴ See *Sims v. Apfel*, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (citing examples from the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals).



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29 which reviewed an adjudicative order issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission.¹⁵ In this
30 case, the Supreme Court described the “general rule that courts should not topple over
31 administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against
32 objection made at the time appropriate under its practice” as one of “simple fairness.”¹⁶ It also
33 said that issue exhaustion promotes orderly procedure and good administration by offering the
34 agency an opportunity to act on objections to its proceedings.¹⁷

35 However, questions about ~~the general applicability~~common law application of the
36 doctrine were raised by the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in *Sims v. Apfel*, which held
37 that ~~jurisprudential~~judicial application of an issue exhaustion requirement was inappropriate on
38 review of the Social Security Administration’s informal, non-adversarial agency adjudications.¹⁸
39 Lower adjudicatory benefit determinations.¹⁹ While at least two appellate courts have continued
40 to apply the doctrine on review of administrative rulemaking after considering *Sims*, courts have
41 inconsistently ~~grasped~~adhered to this distinction, and scholars.²⁰ Scholars have since observed

¹⁵ 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952).

¹⁶ *Id.*; see *Advocates for Hwy. & Auto Safety v. FMCSA*, 429 F.3d 1136, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying the same rationale to rulemaking).

¹⁷ *Id.*; see also *Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Sally Jewell*, Civ. No. 12-1431, slip. op. at 22 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2015) (holding on review of an agency adjudicatory decision that “the question in determining whether an issue was preserved, however, is not simply whether it was raised in some fashion, but whether it was raised with sufficient precision, clarity, and emphasis to give the agency a fair opportunity to address it.”).

¹⁸ *Id.* at 108-12 (“the desirability of a court imposing a requirement of issue exhaustion depends on the degree to which the analogy to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular administrative proceeding”); see also *Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan*, 546 F.3d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply issue exhaustion in the inquisitorial ERISA context where a claimant was not notified of any issue exhaustion requirement).

¹⁹ *Sims*, 530 U.S. at 108-12 (“[T]he desirability of a court imposing a requirement of issue exhaustion depends on the degree to which the analogy to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular administrative proceeding”); see also *Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan*, 546 F.3d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to apply issue exhaustion in the inquisitorial ERISA context where a claimant was not notified of any issue exhaustion requirement).

²⁰ See *Advocates for Hwy. & Auto Safety v. FMCSA*, 429 F.3d at 1148-49; *Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson*, 363 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). But see *Alaska Survival v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 705 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2013)



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42 that issue exhaustion “cases conspicuously lack discussion of whether, when, why, or how
43 exhaustion doctrine developed in the context of adjudication should be applied to rulemaking.”²¹

44 [Alternate preamble language A: The Administrative Conference’s research highlighted,
45 rather than resolved, competing claims about the advisability of the doctrine. Accordingly, the
46 Recommendation does not advocate for or against general application of the doctrine in review
47 of administrative rulemaking in cases where it is not statutorily compelled. It does, however,
48 identify circumstances where common law application of an issue exhaustion requirement may
49 not be appropriate. The Administrative Conference also urges agencies to only pursue an issue
50 exhaustion defense in litigation when they have a good faith belief that none of the exceptions
51 would apply.]

52 [Alternate preamble language B: The Administrative Conference’s research identified
53 competing claims about the advisability of the doctrine. Accordingly, its Recommendation
54 advocates for a middle ground approach that cautions courts to carefully consider whether to
55 apply the doctrine as a matter of common law, but also recognizes that courts generally should
56 not resolve issues litigants did not raise during the administrative rulemaking proceeding. It also
57 identifies circumstances where common law application of an issue exhaustion requirement may

(describing a Surface Transportation Board (STB) exemption as a rulemaking but applying the *Sims* rationale to it because “the STB’s procedures were informal and provided no notice to interested parties that to later challenge the STB’s decision one must submit comments during the exemption process.”).

²¹ Lubbers Report, *supra* note 6, at 40 (citing PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL, GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1246 (10th ed. 2003)); see also ~~William Funk, *Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies—New Dimensions Since Darby*, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (“Unfortunately, some courts have ignored the specific statutory origin for [issue exhaustion] and have applied a similar exhaustion requirement in cases totally unrelated to that statute, while citing cases involving application of that statute.”).~~ *Koretoff v. Vilsack*, 707 F.3d 394, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Williams, J., concurring) (concurring in a decision to preclude preenforcement review of new issues but writing separately “primarily to note that in the realm of judicial review of agency rules, much of the language of our opinions on ‘waiver’ has been a good deal broader than the actual pattern of our holdings, and that that pattern itself may unfairly disadvantage parties that are generally not well represented by interest groups”).



58 not be appropriate, and urges agencies to only pursue an issue exhaustion defense in litigation
59 when they have a good faith belief that none of the exceptions would apply.]

60 [Alternate preamble language C: Although the Administrative Conference’s research
61 identified competing claims about the advisability of the doctrine, its Recommendation
62 recognizes that courts generally should not resolve issues litigants did not raise during the
63 administrative rulemaking proceeding. It does, however, identify circumstances where common
64 law application of an issue exhaustion requirement may not be appropriate. The Administrative
65 Conference also urges agencies to only pursue an issue exhaustion defense in litigation when
66 they have a good faith belief that none of the exceptions would apply.]

67 Although the Administrative Conference believes that statutes should be read to the
68 extent possible to include the exceptions it sets forth in the Recommendation, it did not consider
69 whether Congress should enact new statutory issue exhaustion requirements. The
70 Recommendation is limited in scope to preenforcement review of agency rulemaking, where
71 litigants seek direct review of a rule prior to its application to particular persons in enforcement
72 proceedings.²²

73 Support for an Issue Exhaustion Requirement in Preenforcement Review of Administrative 74 Rulemaking

75 Many of the justifications for application of the issue exhaustion doctrine in judicial
76 review of agency adjudicatory decisions apply squarely to review of rulemakings. ~~The Supreme~~
77 ~~Court has described the “general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions~~

²² The passage of time and new entrants may complicate the inquiry in cases where a rule is challenged in response to an agency enforcement action. The Conference has previously identified issues that Congress should not ordinarily preclude judicial review of when reviewing challenges to judicial rules raised in an enforcement proceeding. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 82-7, *Judicial Review of Rules in Enforcement Proceedings* (Dec. 17, 1982), available at www.acus.gov/82-7.



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78 ~~unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time~~
79 ~~appropriate under its practice” as one of “simple fairness.”²³—Issue exhaustion is said to promote~~
80 ~~orderly procedure and good administration by offering the agency an opportunity to act on~~
81 ~~objections to its~~ active public participation in rulemaking proceedings.²⁴—, create orderly
82 processes for resolution of important legal and policy issues raised in rulemakings, ensure fully
83 informed decisionmaking by administrative agencies and a robust record for judicial review, and
84 provide a certainty and finality to rulemakings that conserves the resources of agencies, courts,
85 and the regulated parties. There is also a concern that, without issue exhaustion, agencies may
86 feel the need to try to anticipate new arguments in court that were not brought to their attention
87 earlier, thus producing problematic delays and overburdening agencies.

88 The argument for ~~prudential~~judicial application of the doctrine in rulemaking ~~is~~may be
89 especially strong in challenges under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, such as
90 where the challenge is to the factual basis of the rule or a claim is made that reasonable
91 alternatives of a rule, where should have been adopted, or to an agency’s failure to exercise its
92 discretion in a particular manner. In those cases, judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of an
93 agency’s action may depend heavily on what the administrative record or on contentions that
94 were presented to the agency during the rulemaking. Application of the doctrine in such cases
95 spares courts from hearing issues that could have been cured at the administrative level and
96 avoids agency justifies denying agencies the opportunity to create post hoc rationalizations. ‡

97 Judicial application of the issue exhaustion doctrine is arguably also compelling in
98 challenges to rulemakings of particular applicability or more formal rulemakings, such as those
99 that include a right to an evidentiary hearing. Even in informal rulemakings, would-be litigants
100 may have some responsibility to comment ~~(if they are able)~~ on a rule they seek to challenge prior

²³ ~~United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952); see Advocates for Hwy. & Auto Safety v. FMCSA, 429 F.3d 1136, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying the same rationale to rulemaking).~~

²⁴ ~~Id.~~



101 to its enforcement. ~~This responsibility may be greater where a rule is likely to involve complex~~²⁵
102 Many agencies have adopted procedures or highly technical for obtaining input on their
103 rulemakings from interested stakeholders and the widespread use of electronic rulemaking
104 dockets and other Internet- and social media-based outlets for public involvement have
105 increased the public's access to the government rulemaking process.²⁶ Moreover, the
106 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e), provides a procedural mechanism for addressing
107 issues, or that were not presented to impose substantial and immediate costs due the agency
108 during a rulemaking proceeding—the public's right to the need for prompt compliance petition
109 agencies for amendment or repeal of rules. Additionally, several statutes containing issue
110 exhaustion requirements, including the Clean Air Act and the Federal Communications Act,
111 specifically provide for an agency reconsideration process.²⁷

112 ~~Conversely,~~ **Concerns with an Issue Exhaustion Requirement in Preenforcement Review of**
113 **Administrative Rulemaking**

114 Nonetheless, some scholars and practitioners argue that courts should not uncritically
115 apply issue exhaustion principles developed in the context of adversarial agency adjudications to
116 the frequently distinguishable context of rulemaking.²⁸ They query whether judicial precedent

²⁵ See *Koretov v. Vilsack*, 707 F.3d 394, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Williams, J., concurring) (commenting that “[g]enerally speaking, then, the price for a ticket to facial review is to raise objections in the rulemaking”).

²⁶ See, e.g., *Transparency in EPA's Operations*, Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator to All EPA Employees (Apr. 2009); see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2013-5, *Social Media in Rulemaking* (Dec. 5, 2013), available at www.acus.gov/2013-5; see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2011-8, *Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking* (Dec. 9, 2011) (describing observations of a variety of innovative public engagement practices at federal agencies), available at www.acus.gov/2011-8.

²⁷ E.g., 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(7)(B); 47 U.S.C. 405(a).

²⁸ See William Funk, *Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies—New Dimensions Since Darby*, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (offering examples to support the argument that “[u]nfortunately, some courts have ignored the specific statutory origin for [] [issue exhaustion] and have applied a similar exhaustion requirement in cases totally unrelated to that statute, while citing cases involving application of that statute”).



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117 that fails to make such distinctions strongly supports general application of the doctrine in judicial
118 review of administrative rulemaking. Critics of a prudential issue exhaustion requirement also
119 cite the presumption of reviewability for final agency actions established by Administrative
120 Procedure Act.²⁹ Some would go so far as to say that issue exhaustion should generally not apply
121 in the absence of an authorizing statute, particularly in light of the high level of deference given
122 to agencies on judicial review.

123 Those who are wary of generally applying the doctrine in review of administrative
124 rulemaking also offer some policy arguments against its application. They point out that
125 administrative agencies have an affirmative responsibility to examine key assumptions and issues,
126 as well as to join rulemaking proceedings to adequately explain the basis and purpose of the rule,
127 and to necessarily raise and decide issues that will affect persons who may not be represented
128 in a rulemaking proceeding. In addition, some judges have raised concerns that. Some fear that
129 overbroad application of the doctrine to rulemakings could serve as a barrier to judicial review
130 for under-resourced non-participants in ~~rulemaking~~rulemakings of general applicability.³⁰ ~~It may~~

131 There is also a concern that issue exhaustion requirements may induce rulemaking
132 participants to try to comment on every possible issue, or to save their comments for the last
133 minute.³¹ Some scholars fear that issue exhaustion requirements import the threat of litigation
134 into administrative rulemakings, resulting in voluminous administrative records that raise further
135 apprehensions regarding information overload or ~~ossification of rulemaking.~~³² ~~There is a lack of~~

²⁹ 5 U.S.C. § 702; 5 U.S.C. § 704.

³⁰ ~~See *Koretov v. Vilsack*, 707 F.3d 394, 401 (2013) (Williams, J., concurring) (“Firms filling niche markets, for example, as appellants appear to be, may be ill represented by broad industry groups and unlikely to be adequately lawyered up at the rulemaking stage.”). *Supra* note 21.~~

³¹ *See* Lubbers Report, *supra* note 6, at 38-40.

³² ~~See *Portland General Elec. Co. v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 501 F.3d 1009, 1024 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If we required each participant in a notice and comment proceeding to raise every issue or be barred from seeking judicial~~



136 ~~empirical evidence demonstrating that issue exhaustion contributes to these potential problems.~~
137 ~~There is also a counterargument that, without issue exhaustion, agencies may feel the need to try~~
138 ~~to anticipate new arguments in court that were not brought to their attention earlier, thus producing~~
139 ~~equally problematic delays and overload for agencies. The Administrative Conference did not try~~
140 ~~to resolve these competing claims—but the concerns do lend additional support for a careful~~
141 ~~delineation of the circumstances in which issue exhaustion is most appropriately enforced on~~
142 ~~review of agency rulemaking regulatory ossification.³³ Although some degree of foresight may~~
143 ~~fairly be expected, stakeholders may not be able to predict and comment on every contingency.~~

144 ~~Even~~Exceptions

145 Both sides agree that, even where statutes prescribe issue exhaustion, the case law
146 recognizes certain exceptions may exist.³⁴ For example, the Supreme Court recently held that the
147 Clean Air Act’s statutory issue exhaustion provision was not “jurisdictional.”³⁵ And courts have
148 relied on their equitable authority to read ~~good cause~~extraordinary circumstances exceptions,
149 such as those traditionally applicable in remedy exhaustion cases, into statutes where they were
150 lacking.³⁶ ~~Courts~~The Conference recognizes that courts applying the issue exhaustion doctrine

~~review of the agency’s action, we would be sanctioning the unnecessary multiplication of comments and proceedings before the administrative agency. That would serve neither the agency nor the parties.”)~~

³³ See Wendy E. Wagner, *Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture*, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1363–64 (2010).

³⁴ *Washington Ass’n for Television and Children v. FCC*, 712 F.2d 677, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[Our] cases assume that § 405 contains implied exceptions without explaining why. We understand these cases, however, as implicitly interpreting § 405 to codify the judicially-created doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which permits courts some discretion to waive exhaustion”) (footnotes omitted).

³⁵ *EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.*, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1602-03 (2014) (“A rule may be ‘mandatory,’ yet not ‘jurisdictional,’ we have explained. Section 7607(d)(7)(B), we hold, is of that character. It does not speak to a court’s authority, but only to a party’s procedural obligations.”) (citations omitted). See also *Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.*, 429 F.3d 1136, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“as a general matter, a party’s presentation of issues during a rulemaking proceeding is not a *jurisdictional* matter”) (emphasis in original).

³⁶ *Washington Ass’n for Television and Children v. FCC*, 712 F.2d 677, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 1983). *Id.* (collecting cases); see generally Lubbers Report.



151 prudentially retain some discretion to waive its application.³⁷ The following Recommendation
152 seeks to offer guidance to the judiciary regarding when exceptions to application of the doctrine
153 on review of administrative rulemaking ~~might~~may be appropriate, ~~while recognizing that judicial~~
154 ~~application of the doctrine.~~ Its focus on “extraordinary circumstances” rather than “reasonable
155 grounds” is ~~inherently discretionary and flexible where it is not statutorily compelled.~~ more limited
156 than many statutory exception provisions.³⁸

157 ~~This Recommendation is limited to pre-enforcement review of agency rulemaking. The~~
158 ~~passage of time and new entrants may complicate the inquiry in cases where a rule is challenged~~
159 ~~in response to an agency enforcement action. Further, the Administrative Conference’s~~
160 ~~recommendations do not take a position on whether Congress should enact new statutory issue~~
161 ~~exhaustion requirements.~~

RECOMMENDATION

162 [Alternate Recommendation language A: 1. Courts should take care to ensure that they
163 do not uncritically extend proceed cautiously in applying issue exhaustion principles
164 developed in the context of adversarial agency adjudications to the frequently
165 distinguishable context of rulemaking review.]

166 ~~-[Alternate Recommendation language B: Precede Recommendation below with “As a~~
167 ~~general principle, in preenforcement review of administrative rulemaking, courts should~~
168 ~~not resolve issues that were not raised with sufficient specificity in the rulemaking~~
169 ~~proceeding to give the agency ~~was not given~~ an opportunity to address ~~during a~~~~
170 ~~rulemaking proceeding because no participant raised them with sufficient precision,~~

³⁷ *Id.* (“[Our] cases assume that § 405 contains implied exceptions without explaining why. We understand these cases, however, as implicitly interpreting § 405 to codify the judicially created doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which permits courts some discretion to waive exhaustion.”) (footnotes omitted).

³⁸ *E.g.*, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(1) (applicable to both adjudication and rulemaking); 27 U.S.C. § 204(h); 49 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4).



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171 ~~clarity, or emphasis.~~ This is particularly true for challenges to the factual support for the
172 ~~rule in the administrative record or to an agency's failure to exercise its discretion.~~
173 ~~However, judicial consideration of previously unstated objections to a rule may be~~
174 ~~warranted under some circumstances, including where:~~ in a particular manner. However,"
175 followed by conforming edits.]

176 1. Except where a statute directs otherwise, judicial consideration of previously unstated
177 objections to an administrative rulemaking may be warranted under the following circumstances:

178 (a) The agency addressed the issue on its own initiative in the rulemaking proceeding or
179 in response to a comment submitted by another participant in the proceeding.

180 (b) The issue was so fundamental to the rulemaking proceeding or the rule's basis and
181 purpose that the agency had a responsibility to address it ~~regardless of whether any~~
182 ~~participant in the proceeding asked it to do so.~~ This narrow exception may include:

183 i. basic obligations of rulemaking procedure, such as well-recognized
184 requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ~~or the,~~ governing
185 ~~statutes~~ statutes, or regulations; or

186 ~~ii.~~ explicit or well established substantive criteria prescribed by ~~the agency's~~
187 governing ~~statutes~~ statutes or regulations; ~~or~~

188 ~~iii. ii.~~ key assumptions that were central to the rulemaking.

189 (c) Circumstances make it clear that the agency's established position on the issue would
190 have made raising the issue in the rulemaking proceeding futile. Futility should not,
191 however, be lightly presumed.

192 ~~(d) The challenging party issue~~ could not ~~reasonably~~ have been ~~expected to raise the issue~~
193 raised during the rulemaking proceeding, ~~because:~~

194 ~~i.~~ ~~the basis for the challenger's objection did not exist during the proceeding,~~ such
195 as ~~issues arising from an unforeseeable variance between the proposed and final~~
196 ~~rule; or~~



197 ~~(d) the because the~~ procedures used by the agency ~~otherwise created an impediment to raising~~
198 ~~the~~ precluded it.

199 ii. ~~This~~ issue, such as ~~where rules were promulgated without an opportunity for~~
200 ~~public participation; or~~

201 iii. ~~other circumstances have materially changed since the rule was issued.~~

202 ~~(e) A strong public interest favors judicial resolution of the issue. Such issues are likely is~~
203 ~~purely legal in nature, so that the agency's perspective would not be entitled to significant~~
204 ~~deference or weight. Examples may include, such as~~ objections that the ~~rule~~ rulemaking
205 ~~is:~~

206 i. ~~unconstitutional;~~

207 ii. ~~patently in excess of the agency's statutory authority;~~ or

208 ~~(e) in violation of an unambiguous statutory requirement,~~ and a strong public interest
209 favours judicial resolution of the issue.

210 (f) ~~Extraordinary~~ Other extraordinary circumstances excuse the failure to raise the
211 objection ~~below~~ in the rulemaking proceeding.

212 ~~3.2.~~ Reviewing courts should allow litigants challenging rules administrative rulemakings
213 to have a full opportunity to demonstrate that they did in fact raise the an issue first with the
214 agency or that any of the above circumstances—militating against application of the issue
215 exhaustion doctrine—are present.

216 ~~4. Agencies should not assert issue exhaustion as a litigation defense in the foregoing~~
217 ~~limited circumstances.~~

218 3. Agencies should be given an opportunity to defend the merits of a rulemaking against
219 new objections raised in the judicial review proceeding. ~~A remand to the agency may be~~
220 ~~appropriate where the new issue is capable of administrative resolution.~~

221 5.4. Agencies should consider the foregoing circumstances when deciding whether to



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222 assert issue exhaustion as a litigation defense.

223 6-5. To the extent possible, statutory requirements for issue exhaustion should be
224 construed and applied in accordance with the foregoing recommendations.

225 7-6. If Congress adopts new statutory issue exhaustion requirements, it should include
226 an exceptions for extraordinary ~~circumstance or reasonable grounds exception~~ circumstances.